Why Anwar's 52% approval rating does not make PH popular with voters?

 

There is a curious contradiction in Malaysian politics today. A Merdeka Center survey put Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's approval rating at 52 per cent — still relatively respectable and the highest among the political leaders tested. 

Yet Pakatan Harapan does not look like a popular political force. Its performance in recent state elections and by-elections has been disappointing, and there is already widespread speculation that PH could face another difficult contest in Melaka.

So how can a Prime Minister remain relatively popular while the coalition behind him appears increasingly vulnerable?

Perhaps the answer is that Anwar's approval and PH's popularity are two very different things. And the reasons go beyond race, religion or Anwar's long political history.

1. Anwar has become the establishment

For most of his political career, Anwar represented the alternative. He was the opposition leader promising reform, clean government and an end to an entrenched political system.

Today, he is the system. That is a fundamental political transformation.

When prices rise, subsidies are reduced, taxes change or government agencies fail to deliver, voters no longer blame only the previous administration. They look towards Anwar.

His greatest political asset — Reformasi — has therefore become his greatest political responsibility.

2. Household economics is more powerful than macroeconomic statistics

The government can point to investment, economic growth, fiscal consolidation, a stronger ringgit and other positive indicators. But voters experience the economy differently.

They see grocery bills, petrol prices, housing costs, school expenses, medical bills and the cost of running a small business. This creates a dangerous gap between economic performance and economic perception.

A government may be able to demonstrate that the economy is improving while voters continue to feel that life is becoming more difficult. And elections are normally fought closer to the kitchen table than the Treasury's balance sheet.

3. Reformasi has created expectations that are difficult to satisfy

Anwar spent decades promising political reform. That created enormous expectations. But reform is inherently slow. Changing institutions, legislation, procurement practices and government culture cannot happen overnight.

The problem is that voters do not necessarily measure reform by legislation passed. They ask whether government feels different. Is corruption really declining? Are government agencies more accountable? Are appointments more transparent? Is there less political interference?

If the answer is not immediately obvious, disappointment grows.

This is particularly important because Anwar's government has itself raised the expectations by repeatedly presenting institutional reform as one of its defining missions.

4. There is a credibility gap between rhetoric and delivery

This is not necessarily an accusation that Anwar is dishonest. It is a problem of political expectations. 

The opposition Anwar could promise broad principles. The Prime Minister Anwar has to implement them — and implementation requires compromise. He has to balance reform against political stability, fiscal discipline against cost-of-living pressures, coalition interests against institutional independence, and competing ethnic and regional expectations.

Every compromise disappoints someone. The reformist voter thinks Anwar has compromised too much. The conservative voter thinks he is changing too much. The business community worries about regulation and taxes. Ordinary households worry about prices.

Anwar therefore risks satisfying nobody completely.

5. Coalition politics has diluted PH's identity

This may be one of PH's biggest problems. The coalition that once represented opposition to the old political order is now governing alongside parties that were previously its opponents. That was probably necessary to create political stability.

But it has blurred PH's identity. What exactly does PH represent today? Reform? Multiracial politics? Progressive politics? Anti-corruption? Or simply support for Anwar's government?

These identities were once largely compatible. They are no longer automatically so. A voter can therefore approve of Anwar while being uncertain about what PH itself represents.

6. Race matters — but not necessarily in the simplistic way

There is undoubtedly a Malay political dimension to Anwar's difficulties. But explaining everything as Malay rejection of Anwar would be too easy.

The deeper problem is that Anwar is trying to occupy the political centre between competing identities. He has to maintain Malay-Muslim legitimacy while governing a multiracial coalition and satisfying a strong reformist constituency.

PN offers Malay voters a much simpler proposition: protect Malay-Muslim interests. DAP has its own established constituency and political identity. 

Anwar has to constantly reassure both sides. That can make him appear insufficiently authentic to either. 

But this does not mean that race is necessarily the primary reason voters are dissatisfied. Cost of living, governance and political fatigue can be equally — or more — important.

7. Malaysians may simply be politically tired

This is perhaps the most underrated factor. Malaysians have gone through Najib, Mahathir, Muhyiddin, Ismail Sabri and finally Anwar in a relatively short period. They have experienced political defections, the Sheraton Move, COVID, coalition changes, inflation, subsidy reforms, corruption cases and endless political arguments.

Many voters may simply want government to work. They are less interested in another grand political narrative. They want affordable food, decent wages, functioning public services, economic opportunity and confidence about the future.

That creates a difficult environment for Anwar because his political career was built around a grand narrative of reform.

The real warning for PH

This brings us back to the 52 per cent approval rating. Anwar can remain personally acceptable while PH becomes electorally unattractive. That is not a contradiction. A voter can say, “I don't think Anwar is doing a terrible job.” 

But that same voter may still say, “I am not convinced PH deserves another term.”

That distinction could become critical as GE16 approaches. Recent state elections have already demonstrated that PH cannot assume that Anwar's personal standing will automatically translate into votes for its candidates.

And this is why repeatedly attacking UMNO may have diminishing returns. Voters certainly remember UMNO's past. But many are increasingly asking a different question: “What are you offering me now?”

If PH continues to campaign mainly against UMNO's past rather than explaining why its own future is better, it risks fighting yesterday's election.

Melaka could become another test of this problem. If PH performs poorly again, it should not simply blame race, religion, UMNO machinery or voter sentiment. It should ask the harder question:

Why are people who may still approve of Anwar not enthusiastic enough to vote for his coalition?

That is the real political puzzle.

Anwar's 52 per cent approval rating may therefore be less comforting than it appears. It tells us that Anwar is still personally acceptable to a significant proportion of Malaysians. It does not tell us that Malaysians are equally enthusiastic about Pakatan Harapan's continued rule.

And that difference — between accepting the Prime Minister and wanting his political team to continue governing — may ultimately determine the next general election.

Goodbye Yellow Brick Road